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DR. REY C. TAMBONG, Petitioner, -versus- R. JORGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
DOING BUSINESS AS PREMUIM AGRO-VET PRODUCTS, INC., AND/OR ROMEO J. JORGE, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 146068
Present: PUNO,
J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, * AZCUNA,
and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: |
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D E C I S I O N
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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: |
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Assailed
in the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari are the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated July 19, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59637 dismissing the petition for
certiorari filed by herein petitioner, and the Resolution dated September 29,
2000 denying his motion for reconsideration.
R. Jorge Development Corporation, respondent, doing
business as Premium Agro-Vet Products, Inc., is a distributor of veterinary
products. It has a national network of
area sales representatives who generally operate singly in their assigned
areas. On
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner, on
In their
Answer to the complaint, respondents asserted that the dismissal from
employment of petitioner is lawful and complied with the required procedural
due process.
On
x x x the evidence show that
complainant’s dismissal from the service is valid and for just causes as
provided under Art. 280 of the Labor Code, as amended. The complainant
committed fraud against respondent company when he claimed reimbursement for
expenses despite the fact that he was on leave of absence and when he failed to
account for amounts released to him for remittance to a customer. Evidence also
showed that he was on leave of absence when he failed to account for amounts
released to him for remittance to a customer.
Evidence also showed that he is guilty of gross negligence, allowing
company products to expire. The same is tantamount to willful misconduct and
serious disobedience, as he admitted causing loss to the respondent. His
repeated failure to comply with company directives respecting submission of
report and remittances of sales collection also constitute just causes for his
termination (sic). x x x
On appeal by petitioner, the NLRC Cagayan
de Oro City, in a Resolution dated
Both parties moved for reconsideration, with petitioner asking
for a partial reconsideration. Respondents prayed for the reinstatement of the
Labor Arbiter’s Resolution dismissing petitioner’s complaint. On the other hand, petitioner asked that he
should also be awarded moral and exemplary damages, wage differentials, sales
commissions and incentives.
On
On
Petitioner timely filed a motion for reconsideration but it
was denied by the Court of Appeals in its second assailed Resolution dated
In
any case, even granting that said counsel received the resolution of October
29, 1999 on November 29, 1999, his filing of a Motion for Reconsideration on
December 6, 1999 consumed seven (7) out of the 60 day period for his filing of
a petition for certiorari; thus, he had only 53 days from April 19, 2000 within
which to file a petition for certiorari. Such period expired on
The
instant petition was filed by registered mail on
Petitioner
now raises the following issue:
Whether
or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the petitioner failed to
comply with Rule 46 on material dates and that the petition for certiorari was filed late.
Respondents,
in their Comment, prayed that the petition be denied for being misleading and
for utter lack of merit.
Petitioner
does not deny that he failed to indicate in his petition for certiorari filed
with the Court of Appeals the date he received a copy of the NLRC October 29,
1999 Resolution. He, however, asserts
that the appellate court should have found that he complied with the Rules considering
that the date of his receipt of the said Resolution was stamped on the copy he
attached as Annex “G” to his petition. Also, in his motion for reconsideration
filed with the NLRC, a copy of which he submitted as Annex “H” of his petition,
he stated therein the date he received a copy of the Resolution. He maintains that his failure to indicate in
the petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals the date of his receipt
of the
There
are three essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65. First, the date when notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution was received; second, when a
motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed; and third, when
notice of the denial thereof was received.[1] Failure of petitioner to comply with this
requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.[2] Substantial
compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance with the
Rules.[3]
Here,
petitioner failed to state the first date. He admitted that he did not allege
in his petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals when he received
a copy of the NLRC Resolution of
In
The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is for the purpose of determining its timeliness. Such a petition is required to be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or Resolution sought to be assailed. Therefore, that the petition for certiorari was filed forty-one (41) days from receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration is hardly relevant. The Court of Appeals was not in any position to determine when this period commenced to run and whether the motion for reconsideration itself was filed on time since the material dates were not stated. It should not be assumed that in no event would the motion be filed later than fifteen (15) days. Technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals found that
the petition for certiorari was filed late.
Even assuming that it was filed on time, we find no reason to disturb
the findings of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that the dismissal of
petitioner from employment was for valid and just causes under Article 280 of
the Labor Code. In fact, the NLRC ruled
that petitioner is “guilty of not just one cause, but of almost all the just
causes available.” At this juncture, it
is relevant to emphasize that this Court is not a trier
of facts.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM
the challenged Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
59637. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
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(On leave) RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
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CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
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I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
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* On leave.
[1] Section 3, par. 2, Rule 46, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended by Supreme Court Circular No. 39-98, dated August 18, 1998; Santos, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., GR. No. 141947, July 25, 2001, 360 SCRA 512; Great Southern Maritime Services Corporation v. Acuña, et al., G.R. No. 140189, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 422.
[2] Section 3, par. 6, ibid.
[3] Ortiz
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127393,
[4] Pet
Plans, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148287,
[5] G.R. No. 141947,